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Organizational Change and Institutional Survival:
The Case of the U.N. Peacebuilding Commission
Rob Jenkins ∗

I.

INTRODUCTION

The United Nations Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) is one of
the few concrete institutional legacies of former Secretary General
Kofi Annan’s ambitious agenda for reforming the world body. The
PBC came formally into existence in June 2006, six months after
identical resolutions authorizing its creation were passed by the Gen1
eral Assembly and the Security Council.
The PBC was conceived to fill a perceived gap in the United Nations’s institutional fabric. In the words of Annan’s 2005 manifesto
for U.N. reform, In Larger Freedom, “there is a gaping hole in the
United Nations institutional machinery: no part of the United Nations system effectively addresses the challenge of helping countries
2
with the transition from war to lasting peace.” The logic behind the
PBC’s creation, first formally proposed in December 2004 in the report of the Secretary General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, was as follows: the Security Council is charged
with maintaining peace and security; the Economic and Social Council is responsible for long-term development issues; but no dedicated
intergovernmental machinery exists for addressing the needs of
countries that have emerged from a period of war—particularly civil
war, during which governmental authority evaporates—but have not
yet achieved the degree of state consolidation required to pursue a
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S.C. Res. 1645, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1645 (Dec. 20, 2005) [hereinafter S.C. Res.
1654]; G.A. Res. 60/180, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/180 (Dec. 20, 2005).
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systematic development agenda. They are still “fragile” states, not
yet even regular “developing” or even “least developed” countries.
What the United Nations needed, according to the September
2005 U.N. Summit Outcome Document, through which heads of state
and government endorsed the proposal to create a Peacebuilding
Commission, was a new body that could exercise oversight over the
slow and uneven process by which—if circumstances permit—
systemic violence and fragmented authority structures give way to civil
4
politics and state consolidation. A new intergovernmental institution was required to (1) coordinate the efforts of international actors,
within and beyond the U.N. system, working to rebuild failed states;
(2) sustain global public attention to “post-conflict” countries that
threaten to slip down (or off) the international community’s radar;
and (3) marshal additional external resources for post-conflict countries so that financial flows (the lifeblood of nascent states) are made
5
more predictable.
Whether this was, in fact, a logical conclusion for the international community collectively to have reached—especially when considered alongside the organizational pathologies that have long
6
plagued the U.N. system —is debatable. Arguably, the United Nations has faced severe difficulties rebuilding failed states, not for the
lack of an intergovernmental body devoted to a particular phase in
the continuum between war and peace, but because of larger, more
systemic problems, which an intergovernmental body possessing no
7
executive authority stands little chance of rectifying.
Among the most visible of these challenges is the proliferation of
U.N. entities engaged in various aspects of post-conflict peacebuilding, such as reforming security agencies, monitoring elections, establishing institutions to hold war criminals to account, rebuilding the
economic infrastructure, promoting inter-communal tolerance, enhancing the capacity of civil society advocates to lobby for democratic
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U.N. High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Changes, A More Secure
World: Our Shared Responsibility, (Dec. 2, 2004), http://www.un.org/secureworld/
report.pdf.
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See G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶¶ 97–105, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Oct. 24, 2005).
5
S.C. Res. 1645, supra note 1, Preamble.
6
See MICHAEL BARNETT & MARTHA FINNEMORE, RULES FOR THE WORLD:
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN GLOBAL POLITICS 34–41 (2004).
7
The primacy of politics, rather than bureaucratic efficiency, is emphasized in
such studies as SIMON CHESTERMAN, YOU, THE PEOPLE: THE UNITED NATIONS,
TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATION AND STATE-BUILDING (2004).
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development, and so forth. But without direct or indirect control
over a critical mass of the humanitarian and development agencies
concerned, a new commission, working with little more than a mandate to “coordinate” the efforts of U.N. and other actors working in
9
post-conflict countries, would seem to be of dubious value.
The somewhat vague and meandering resolution that created
the PBC duly emphasizes the other reasons a new body was seen to be
needed: the lack of sustained international attention to post-conflict
countries once an accord is signed or peacekeepers begin departing;
the absence of predictable flows of external finance for post-conflict
governments; and onerous procedures for reporting to the huge
array of donor agencies—multilateral, bilateral, and non10
governmental—from which aid is received. But coordination—
developing common approaches among external actors and instituting rational divisions of labor among all actors, both domestic and international—is in a sense the PBC’s core objective, which if realized
11
would, in theory, enable others fulfillment of the others.
As a mechanism for coordinating the international community’s
efforts to rebuild failed states, the PBC can point to few tangible successes of its own making. Sierra Leone’s successful elections of 2007,
in which power changed hands with a minimum of violence, had lit-

8

The gradual expansion of the various dimensions of peacebuilding is documented in HO-WON JEONG, PEACEBUILDING IN POSTCONFLICT SOCIETIES: STRATEGY AND
PROCESS (2005), as well as in policy-analysis documents such as Shepard Forman,
Building Civilian Capacity for Conflict Management and Sustainable Peace (2004), available
at http://www.cic.nyu.edu/archive/conflict/Forman-%20Building%20Civilian%20
Capacity.pdf.
9
This was a prominent view in the extensive consultations on institutional design that preceded the PBC’s establishment—among member-states, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), U.N. officials, and policy academics. See, e.g., CTR. ON
INT’L COOPERATION, CONSULTATION REPORT: POST CONFLICT TRANSITIONS, NATIONAL
EXPERIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL REFORM (2005); INT’L PEACE RES. INST., TOWARDS A
FRAMEWORK FOR PEACEBUILDING: GETTING THEIR ACT TOGETHER: OVERVIEW REPORT OF
THE JOINT UTSTEIN STUDY OF PEACEBUILDING (2004).
10
See generally S.C. Res. 1645, supra note 1. These general preoccupations are
outlined in the preamble to Resolution 1654, but are made specific “purposes” of the
PBC in the various sections of paragraph two. The financial aspects of peacebuilding
receive special mention in a number of places, including paragraph twenty-four,
which calls for the creation of a Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), and paragraphs that
mention the need for coordination with the International Financial Institutions
(IFIs). Id. ¶¶ 7(e), 9, 14.
11
Roland Paris & Timothy D. Sisk, Understanding the “Coordination Problem” in PostWar State-Building, in THE DILEMMAS OF STATEBUILDING: CONFRONTING THE
CONTRADICTIONS OF POSTWAR PEACE OPERATIONS (forthcoming 2008) (discussing the
international community’s preoccupation with coordination—and the tendency of
this obsession to obscure more fundamental problems).
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tle to do with the PBC. By the same token, had things turned out
badly, the PBC could not reasonably have taken the blame.
Whether the PBC has made substantial contributions to staterebuilding in the countries in which it has worked is a matter of interpretation. The verdict depends critically on which benchmarks
12
are considered reasonable. Regardless of which standards one applies, however, PBC-defenders are liable to reply that the PBC must
be cut greater slack. As a new institution, it was forced to incur the
inevitable (one-off) start-up costs of devising organizational structures, agreeing on working methods, and finding suitable channels
for relating with other parts of the United Nations, notably the Security Council. Moreover, the acrimony that attended the prior debate
concerning whether a PBC should be created—and if so, of what
type—meant that the PBC went through a traumatic pregnancy and
13
difficult birth, from which it is still convalescing.
One way in which the PBC is supposed to enhance coordination
in the rebuilding of post-conflict states is by devising “integrated
peacebuilding strategies” (IPBSs). These are mentioned in the PBC’s
founding resolutions generically, as among the PBC’s responsibilities,
but with no definition of what they should include, what purposes
14
they should serve, and how they should be operationalized.
Handed a blank slate, the Peace Building Support Office (PBSO)
took the lead in developing these IPBSs as “compacts”—emulating
the terminology of the post-conflict, aid-coordination agreement
used in Afghanistan following the Taliban’s demise in late 2001.
Compacts of this type specify a range of goals and actions that development agencies and government authorities will pursue. The word
compact struck some (mainly developing country) PBC members as
too legalistic for what Resolution 1645 calls merely a “strategy.” The
term “framework” was ultimately agreed upon, although these IPBS
(or Framework) documents structurally adopt much of the form of a
compact, indicating commitments on the part of donors, government
authorities, and the PBC itself. By the end of 2007, the PBC had developed “Peacebuilding Frameworks” for Burundi and Sierra Leone,
12

A group of NGOs that produced a first-year report card on the PBC in June
2007 found that, procedurally, the PBC had made great progress—especially in terms
of consulting civil society—but that the PBC did less well when it came to appreciating the “political” aspects of peacebuilding in Burundi and Sierra Leone. See ACTION
AID, CAFOD & CARE INTERNATIONAL, CONSOLIDATING THE PEACE? VIEWS FROM SIERRA
LEONE AND BURUNDI ON THE UNITED NATIONS PEACEBUILDING COMMISSION (2007).
13
Interview with a consultant to one of Kofi Annan’s key advisers during 2005, in
New York City, N.Y. (Feb. 13, 2007).
14
S.C. Res. 1645, supra note 1, ¶ 2.
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the first two countries on its agenda. Each national Framework ostensibly represents a common approach to rebuilding state authority
that all actors—national and international—have agreed jointly to
pursue. In theory, a shared vision, complemented by an agreed division of labor, should mitigate the debilitating fragmentation of the
international community’s work in post-conflict environments.
Substantively, the PBC-brokered Frameworks for Burundi and
Sierra Leone are mainly collages of existing national strategy documents. They, for the most part, reaffirm the importance of policy
measures and institutional reforms that had already, in one form or
another, been agreed to between each of the governments and its respective consortium of donors. The Framework documents for Burundi and Sierra Leone do assign general responsibilities to govern15
ment actors, external donors, and indeed the PBC. But in the end,
the PBC has no authority to insist that independent donor agencies—
the bilateral aid programs of leading member-states as well as planning and operational staff of multilateral agencies—restructure their
country strategies if these appear to duplicate (or in some other way
undermine) the work of peacebuilding actors, domestic or external.
Moreover, there are scant grounds for believing that the “monitoring and tracking” mechanisms devised for each of the two countries’ Peacebuilding Frameworks will influence the behavior of government authorities or donor agencies that may find it convenient to
16
stray from agreed commitments.
This is only partly because the
Frameworks lack viable enforcement mechanisms. As important is
the difficulty of identifying agreed benchmarks for measuring progress in the typical “priority areas” identified: youth employment,
governance reform, capacity-building, and so forth.
15

U.N. Peacebuilding Comm’n, Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi,
U.N. Doc. PBC/1/BDI/4 (June 22, 2007); U.N. Peacebuilding Comm’n, Sierra Leone
Peacebuilding Cooperation Framework, U.N. Doc. PBC/2/SLE/1 (Dec. 3, 2007).
16
For Sierra Leone, issues of “Review and Tracking Progress” are treated in Sierra Leone’s Framework document itself. U.N. Peacebuilding Comm’n, Sierra Leone
Peacebuilding Cooperation Framework, ¶¶ 30–35, U.N. Doc. PBC/2/SLE/1 (Dec. 3,
2007). “Monitoring and tracking” for Burundi’s Framework are dealt with in a separate document. See U.N. Peacebuilding Comm’n, Monitoring and Tracking Mechanism
of the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi, U.N. Doc. PBC/2/BDI/4 (Nov.
27, 2007). The intergovernmental discussions that preceded the adoption of the
“Monitoring and Tracking Mechanism” for Burundi revealed the discomfort of many
states with the vague—and seemingly unenforceable—provisions for systematic follow-up action. See U.N. Peacebuilding Comm’n, Burundi Configuration, Chairman’s
Summary: Informal Meeting on Monitoring and Tracking Mechanism of the Strategic Framework
for
Peacebuilding
in
Burundi,
(Oct.
18,
2007),
available
at
http://www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding/Country-Specific%20Configurations/
Burundi/Chair%20summary_18Oct07.pdf.
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There is, in short, little evidence that the PBC has promoted
substantive coordination among the donors and other external actors
operating in the first two countries placed on its agenda. This has
prevented the achievement of the PBC’s other main objectives, all of
which rely, in one respect or another, on enhanced coordination.
There are various reasons for this, most of which, I have argued elsewhere, stem from the PBC’s organizational design, which all but en17
sures a North-South deadlock on many crucial issues.
On the other hand, the PBC has had a number of small successes that could, on a more expansive reading of the term, be considered examples of improved coordination. They are extremely varied—everything from strengthening links between the PBC and the
Security Council, to participation in interagency processes by the
PBSO, whose creation was specified in the PBC’s founding resolu18
tion. These minor triumphs are usually of limited short-term consequence. But they at least stand a chance of adding up over time.
This essay examines a sample of these institutional developments
to provide a fuller account of what actions the PBC—and crucially, as
we shall see, each of its component parts—has been taking, and why
the pattern that is emerging may be significant. The examples discussed demonstrate how successful the PBC has been when measured
against a quite different yardstick, that of institutional survival in a
very densely populated organizational habitat: the community of international post-conflict reconstruction and state-building agencies
centered in the United Nations, which is itself undergoing near19
constant change. New institutional structures either adapt to their
ecological context or wither, remaining in form even if empty of substance. The PBC, whatever else may be said of its operation to date, is
not empty of substance. It has adapted and survived its institutional

17

See Rob Jenkins, The U.N. Peacebuilding Commission and the Dissemination of International Norms, (London Sch. Econ. Crisis States Res. Ctr., Working Paper 39, 2008),
available at http://www.crisisstates.com/publications/phase2papers.htm.
18
S.C. Res. 1645, supra note 1, ¶ 23.
19
That arrangements for post-conflict planning and operations have been in a
state of organizational flux for a considerable period can be seen from U.N. reforms
instituted in 1997 to give the “lead peacebuilding role” to the United Nations’s Department of Political Affairs, which was expected to oversee country-level “Peace
Building Support Offices” (PBSOs). The role of these country-level PBSOs was to
encompass, among other things, “confidence-building and political stabilization efforts, electoral support, [and] efforts to strengthen and legitimate a new government
established through political support.” See James Busumtwi-Sam, Alexander Costy &
Bruce D. Jones, Structural Deficits and Institutional Adaptations to Conflict and Peacebuilding in Africa, in DURABLE PEACE: CHALLENGES FOR PEACEBUILDING IN AFRICA 354, 378
(Taiser M. Ali & Robert O. Matthews eds., 2004).
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infancy, and its emerging shape is largely a reflection of the political
and organizational context into which it has been born. It is an actor
with which other institutional stakeholders must contend. This is no
mean feat. The PBC has taken its place in a crowded field as much
through improvisation on the part of key actors associated with this
complex organ as it has through the rational development of clear
operational guidelines.
This essay makes the case that observing and analyzing the process by which the PBC attempts to strike roots—that is, to occupy an
institutional niche by creatively interpreting an imprecise and malleable mandate—is revealing about the micro-dynamof U.N. reforms.
Member-states, U.N. agencies, Secretariat departments, insider nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), various U.N. Councils and
Commissions—each seeks to steer the new structures to its own purposes, or to ensure that, at a minimum, any newly created body does
not stray onto its turf. This is a recipe for institutional gridlock. But
possibilities exist for the organizationally entrepreneurial.
Finally, it will be argued that a significant factor in explaining
the PBC’s ability successfully to begin occupying an organizational
niche within the U.N. system—and within the post-conflict state20
reconstruction community more generally —is the set of incentives
facing key actors within the PBC. PBC actors are strongly motivated
to focus on their own “sub-institutional” component of the PBC. The
PBC has, in effect, disaggregated itself into these component parts
(or sub-institutions) to maximize its chances of survival.
The three main components of the PBC were outlined in Security Council Resolution 1645: the intergovernmental PBC itself, the
bureaucratic PBSO, and a standing Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), consisting of voluntary contributions. Though originally thought of and
referred to collectively as the PBC, they are now more commonly regarded as elements comprising the United Nations’s new “peacebuilding architecture,” with the moniker “Peacebuilding Commission” correctly reserved for the intergovernmental component. This
shift in terminology is significant, representing an attempt on the
part of both the PBSO and the PBF to assert their own relative
autonomy from the PBC. The adaptive strategies deployed by both
the intergovernmental Commission itself—including its memberstates, with all their conflicting perceptions and interests—and the

20

Roland Paris, Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism, 22 INT’L
SECURITY 54, 54–89 (1997).
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bureaucratic PBSO are analyzed in more detail than is the PBF, which
21
for reasons of space receives only cursory treatment.
The remainder of the essay will proceed as follows: Part II briefly
outlines the PBC’s basic structure and mandate and makes the case
for seeing the PBC’s adaptive success as a product of the individual
strategies of its three main components. Part III examines the intergovernmental face of the PBC. The bureaucratic PBSO is analyzed in
Part IV. Part V concludes with a summary of the argument, an overview of how the PBF—the third of the UN peacebuilding architecture’s three components—is identifying and beginning to occupy its
own institutional niche, and an assessment of the forces most likely to
impinge on the PBC’s future institutional trajectory.
II. THE PEACEBUILDING ARCHITECTURE:
THE PBC’S MISSION AND STRUCTURE
Before proceeding to an analysis of key events that took place
during the PBC’s first two years in existence, a brief description of the
structure, procedures, and formal mandate of the PBC is in order.
The PBC’s mission is to assist states “emerging from conflict” to
22
avoid lapsing back into violence—an all too familiar occurrence. As
an intergovernmental body composed of thirty-one member-states,
the PBC’s core mission is to galvanize the international community
around the challenge of rebuilding collapsed states and, in particular, to translate this interest into concrete commitments of long-term
financing, of transformed donor practices, and of coordination
among the U.N. agencies, bilateral donors, and non-governmental
organizations contributing to these peace- and state-building efforts.
While, strictly speaking, the PBC itself is an intergovernmental
body, the term “Peacebuilding Commission” is commonly (if incorrectly) used to refer to the triad of institutional pillars on which the
United Nations’s new “peacebuilding architecture” rests. The three
pillars are outlined in Resolution 1645, passed simultaneously and
identically by the Security Council and the General Assembly in December 2005, little more than three months after the World Summit
23
endorsed the PBC’s creation. The three pillars are:

21

The PBF will be discussed in greater detail in a forthcoming book-length analysis of the PBC. See ROB JENKINS, PEACEBUILDING: FROM CONCEPT TO COMMISSION
(forthcoming 2009).
22
HUMAN SECURITY CENTRE, HUMAN SECURITY REPORT 2005: WAR AND PEACE IN THE
21ST CENTURY (2005).
23
See generally S.C. Res. 1645, supra note 1.
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The thirty-one-member-state PBC itself, which convenes
in two forms:
a. as the Organizational Committee (just the thirtyone members), which decides on the structures
and procedures through which the commission is
to undertake its work; and
b. in Country-Specific Configurations (CSCs),
wherein the PBC engages with particular postconflict countries on its agenda, and which includes, in addition to the thirty-one core members, the following: a selection of member-states
selected on the basis of proximity to the postconflict state in question or recent experience
recovering from conflict; relevant U.N. agencies,
secretariat departments, and senior field managers; regional and sub-regional bodies (the African and European Unions, for instance); and the
Washington-based International Financial Institutions (IFIs), notably the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF).
The PBSO, which is a relatively small bureaucratic entity
located within the Executive Office of the Secretary General and, therefore, independent of the Department of
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department
of Political Affairs (DPA), that (a) provides administrative
and analytical support to the PBC; and (b) is responsible
for refining U.N. peacebuilding doctrine by developing
best-practice notes and operational metrics, and for disseminating these throughout the U.N. system and the
larger peacebuilding community of practice.
The PBF, which relies on voluntary contributions from
member-states, multilateral donors, and individuals—and
seeks to maintain a US $250 million replenishable
fund available, was conceived as a quick-disbursement
funding source for catalytic actions to address crises that
may threaten a fragile peace or projects that temporarily
fill gaps in a post-conflict country’s peacebuilding strategy.

Member-states that serve on the PBC are drawn from a series of functional and organizational constituencies, or stakeholder groups:
seven members from the Security Council (the Security Council’s
permanent members automatically occupy five of these seats); seven
members from the General Assembly; seven members from the Economic and Social Council; five members from among the top ten
Troop Contributing Countries to U.N. peace operations; and five
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members from among the top ten financial contributors to U.N.
peace operations. Due consideration to regional balance is to be
given in the implementation of this formula. In the months following passage of Resolution 1645, an enormous amount of energy went
into establishing the specific criteria for PBC membership-eligibility
for each stakeholder category and the procedures through which
members would be selected from within each group.
While the resolutions that created the PBC and its component
parts contains a fair helping of ambiguous language and stray turns
of phrase, its mandate centers on actions that might allow the PBC (i)
to perform a coordinating function, herding together the hugely diverse array of aid agencies (official and non-governmental, national
and international) working in a given post-conflict setting; and (ii) to
ensure that optimal levels of funding are attained, that donors do not
undermine one another in their choice of programmatic interventions, and that internationally funded work is based on a thorough
analysis of which state-rebuilding strategies have worked in the past,
and why. The resolution identified, in effect, three broad functions
24
for the PBC:
1.

2.

3.

“To bring together all relevant actors to marshal resources and to advise on and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery”;
“To focus attention on the reconstruction and institutionbuilding efforts necessary for recovery from conflict and
to support the development of integrated strategies in
order to lay the foundation for sustainable development”;
and
“To provide recommendations and information to improve the coordination of all relevant actors within and
outside the United Nations, to develop best practices, to
help to ensure predictable financing for early recovery
activities and to extend the period of attention given by
the international community to post-conflict recovery.”

The vague language in which laws or legal agreements are expressed
as often reflects uneasy compromise among those who framed them
as it does intellectual laziness. Ambiguous phrases and unspecified
concepts are helpful to contracting parties who must find ways of deferring conflict over certain matters—by expressing them in terms
that invite future interpretive contention—in order to secure agreement on other, related issues of immediate importance. In the case
of the PBC, the profusion of ambiguities has fueled efforts by various
24

S.C. Res. 1645, supra note 1, ¶ 2.
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actors throughout the U.N. system, and beyond, to use the new body
to further their agendas and to enhance their visibility. It has also,
not surprisingly, caused stakeholders in each of the PBC’s three
components to seek ways of demonstrating their component’s unique
comparative advantage in the field of post-conflict peacebuilding.
At this early stage in its institutional development, the PBC is still
grappling with how its fuzzy mandate can be translated into operational terms. Determining the precise relationship between the three
pillars of the peacebuilding architecture is a major part of this process. For instance, the PBSO and the PBF both engage with the same
country cases that the intergovernmental PBC does. And, yet, both
the PBSO and the PBF deal also with cases that are not on the PBC’s
agenda, furnishing them with distinct organizational missions and
identities.
Similarly, the links between each of the three pillars and external
actors continue to be subjected to trial-and-error experimentation. It
remains unclear, for instance, precisely how the PBC is to advise the
Security Council or the General Assembly. Proposing “integrated
peacebuilding strategies” for the countries on its agenda is about as
specific as it gets. It is not apparent how detailed such strategies
ought to be, how they should be carried out, or what the proper
mechanisms for monitoring their implementation and impacts are.
The only more or less unambiguous feature of the relationship between the PBC and external bodies has been the lack of operational
authority that the PBC possesses over any U.N. department, agency,
fund, office, or program.
Despite these limitations, it was hoped that the PBC’s broad
membership would furnish its deliberations with the clout necessary
to play two crucial brokering roles. The first, as mentioned above,
would be a coordinating role, forging agreements among the many
international agencies operating in post-conflict countries. The PBC,
working with the PBSO, was expected to perform a second, analytical
function as well—that is, to draw on the experience of actors
throughout the U.N. system and beyond to identify examples of “best
practice” in post-conflict peacebuilding and state-building—these
“lessons learned” to be disseminated throughout the international
community of peacebuilding agencies.
While the PBC was conceived as an advisory body to the Security
Council—additional reporting to the General Assembly was included
at the insistence of a highly vocal group of mainly developing coun-
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25

tries—the PBC’s architects still believed that the inclusion as nonvoting participants of U.N. bodies and other global or regional bodies
most directly involved in post-conflict peacebuilding (including the
IFIs), would make it a sufficiently comprehensive forum, convened at
a high enough level, for binding commitments by agency principals
to emerge through a process of facilitated negotiation. The PBC
would perform this function in two ways: first, through engagement
with specific country cases (these having been referred by the Security Council or the Secretary General, with the consent of the government concerned); and second, through its advisory function,
which would take the form of recommendations rendered directly to
the Security Council and the General Assembly as well as through the
dissemination of best-practice guidelines in post-conflict statebuilding.
By adjusting our analytical perspective in two key respects—first,
by focusing on institutional survival and the adaptability that makes
such survival possible, and second, by assessing each of the PBC’s
three components individually—we can discern how the PBC has
used the less-visible aspects of its mandate to demonstrate its institutional value-added.
We turn now to an examination of how each of the PBC’s three
components has leveraged a slice of the organization’s mandate to
secure a niche within the international peacebuilding community.
Institutional disaggregation is a critical factor in explaining the PBC’s
ability to adapt to the unpromising institutional environment into
which it was thrust at birth—an atmosphere wherein organizational
interests within and beyond the United Nations work tirelessly to remake the still-plastic term peacebuilding into what they want it to
26
mean.

25

It is worth noting that at least some supporters of the original PBC concept
privately disown the compromise institution that member-states ultimately agreed
upon, viewing the PBC as presently constituted as a disfigured version of their original conception. Interview with a consultant to one of Kofi Annan’s key advisers during 2005, in New York City, N.Y. (Feb. 13, 2007); and interview with a high-ranking
official from a developing country mission that played a central role in negotiating
the PBC’s institutional design, in New York City, N.Y. (Nov. 2, 2007).
26
For an analysis of the various (mainly self-serving) meanings attached to the
term peacebuilding by bilateral aid agencies, multilateral institutions, and other institutional actors, see Michael Barnett, Hunjoon Kim, Madalene O’Donnell & Laura
Sitea, Peacebuilding: What Is in A Name?, 13 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 1, 35–58 (2007).
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III. THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PBC: COUNTERBALANCING THE IFIS
Each of the three components of the peacebuilding architecture—the intergovernmental PBC itself, the bureaucratic PBSO, and
the PBF—must confront a unique set of challenges and face a distinct
array of institutional stakeholders. There are clear and intentional
points of overlap between the three sub-institutions. Were they not at
least conceived as an integrated system, the PBC’s mission to promote
coherence would appear even more unattainable than it does already. In order to secure an organizational role for itself, each of the
three institutional components must identify and play to its strengths.
This entails, among other things, demonstrating its value to one or
more constituencies in the wider international community. Organizational positioning of this type is more effective if buttressed by
other sources of institutional legitimacy – for instance, association
with a widely held norm, such as ‘human rights’ or ‘the protection of
27
civilians.’ The three PBC components do not necessarily share the
same interests. Indeed, not only are there significant points of friction among the three, there are serious conflicts within each of them
as well.
None of this should be surprising if we consider that the PBC is
itself a site of contestation, another arena in which long-running political battles are played out. These include ideological differences
between groups of states: the North-South divide—the gulf separating
the developing from the developed world—is perhaps the most visible. As an arena for contestation, the PBC and its component parts
also attract attention from bureaucratic and political interest groups
(within and outside the United Nations) that seek a platform from
which to advance their agendas and amplify their organizational
28
voices.
27

This distinction, which might usefully be contrasted as output and input legitimacy, is contained within several of the contributions to THE LEGITIMACY OF
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (Jean-Marc Coicaud & Veijo Heiskanen eds., 2001).
See Gerd Junne, International Organizations in a Period of Globalization: New (Problems of)
Legitimacy, in THE LEGITIMACY OF INTERNATINOAL ORGANIZATIONS 189–220 (2001);
Jean-Marc Coicaud, International Democratic Culture and Its Sources of Legitimacy: The
Case of Collective Security and Peacekeeping Operations in the 1990s, in THE LEGITIMACY OF
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 256–308 (2001).
28
Both civil society groups and bureaucratic actors have repeatedly pointed to
the PBC as a key institution for the advancement of sectoral or thematic issues of particular concern to them. For instance, in late-2006, the Secretary General’s representative on Human Rights for Internally Displaced Persons informed the General Assembly’s “Third Committee” that he expected the PBC “to be an extremely
important body to address situations of internal displacement.” Press Release, General Assembly, Expert in Third Committee Cites “Suprising Lack of Awareness”
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The PBC’s intergovernmental machinery, as noted, consists of
both an Organizational Committee and Country Specific Configurations, in which PBC members (plus an assortment of other invitees,
including the IFIs) consider cases on the PBC’s agenda. Burundi and
Sierra Leone were the only two cases on the PBC’s agenda for its first
eighteen months in existence, with Guinea Bissau and the Central African Republic added in late-2007 and mid-2008, respectively. The
designers of the new U.N. peacebuilding architecture considered its
intergovernmental pillar the institution’s crucial feature: the collective moral weight of member-states, with their links to systems of
popular political representation, was seen as an indispensable tool for
international “engagement” with countries attempting to transit from
war to peace.
In the cases of Burundi and Sierra Leone—the two cases on
which this essay focuses—the PBC has not necessarily brought about
the deep, strategic coherence among external development actors
29
that its architects may originally have hoped for, let alone more
harmonious relations between international agencies and postconflict governments themselves. In fact, there is some evidence that
the PBC has in some cases exacerbated latent antagonisms between
Burundi and Sierra Leone, on the one hand, and their respective international donors, on the other. This is the antithesis of coordination.
Paradoxically, these heightened tensions, which are little more
than a ratcheting-up of the donor-recipient sparring that goes on all
the time, have contributed to enhanced coherence of another kind.
In particular, by broadcasting donor-recipient squabbles to a wider
audience of member-states and other important stakeholders, the
PBC’s structured deliberations have created openings for a coalition
of (mainly) developing country member-states, abetted by motivated
elements within the United Nations’s extended bureaucracy, to
counter what is widely regarded as the excessive influence of the
Washington-based IFIs in fragile and post-conflict countries. It has

Among Government Officials of Torture as Most Serious Human Rights Violation,
U.N. Doc. GA/SHC/3860 (Oct. 23, 2006). The jockeying for position began even
before the PBC came into being. See Building a New Role for the United Nations: The Responsibility to Protect, (Carlos Espósito & Jessica Almqvist eds., FRIDE, Working Paper
No. 12, 2005), available at http://www.fride.org (click on the “Publications” tab, and
then on the link for 2005 articles).
29
Interview with an official from a developing country mission to the United Nations, New York City, N.Y. (Nov. 7, 2008).
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long been a complaint among U.N. staff and academics that the
rigid economic policy prescriptions of the World Bank and the IMF
are a significant problem from a peacebuilding perspective. For instance, an insistence on privatization—whether on narrow fiscal
grounds or for other reasons—can, under certain circumstances,
prove disastrous, depriving states of the opportunities to accommodate potential spoilers with high-level positions beyond the security
sector—posts with significant patronage potential that could form the
31
foundations of a (non-violent) political career. A shrinking public
sector payroll in general can prove problematic when the promise of
government jobs, to be distributed among competing groups on the
basis of a negotiated formula, was integral to the structure of a given
peace agreement.
Whatever the merits or shortcomings of privatization (or state
retrenchment generally) as a policy choice, the relevant point is that
policy outcomes that IFI officials might regard as unpleasant but unavoidable economic dislocations—short-term corrections undertaken
to secure higher long-term growth—often have extremely grave po32
litical and security implications that go unnoticed.
Policy decisions—particularly those with a fiscal dimension, or those which have
distributional implications of a spatial nature, especially if the decision maps onto a particular pattern of ethnic geography—can all too
easily undermine extremely delicate mediation and verification processes that U.N. officials and other diplomatic actors have in some
cases spent years setting in motion. In private conversations, U.N. officials specializing in post-conflict environments complain that their
work in post-conflict countries is directly undermined by inflexible
IFI policy, which tends to regard as wasteful subsidies the staterebuilding activities that are necessary to convince large numbers of
people that peace dividends do exist and will continue to be forth30

See, e.g., ROLAND PARIS, AT WAR’S END: BUILDING PEACE AFTER CIVIL CONFLICT 167
(2004) (that “neoliberal” policies had been thrust on post-conflict states in ways that
threatened the establishment of a sustainable peace was a key argument of the author); Roland Paris, Broadening the Study of Peace Operations, 2 INT’L STUD. REV. 27, 35–
36 (2000) (explaining the role of ideas, as opposed to interests or institutions, in the
adoption of this overall policy framework).
31
This is a consistent theme in the research emerging from the Crisis States Programme Development Research Centre, which is funded by the United Kingdom’s
Department for International Development. See James Putzel, Politics, the State and the
Impulse for Social Protection: The Implications of Karl Polanyi’s Ideas for Understanding Development and Crisis, (Crisis States Programme Working Paper No.18, 2002), available
at http://www.crisisstates.com/download/wp/WP18JP.pdf.
32
See generally MARK DUFFIELD, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND THE NEW WARS: THE
MERGING OF DEVELOPMENT AND SECURITY (2001).
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coming if agreements are heeded and a democratic culture becomes
33
U.N. officials also argue that Security Council manentrenched.
dates to prevent the recurrence of violence should not be hemmed in
by economic orthodoxy. The early phases of peacebuilding almost by
definition involve more strengthening of the state’s hand in the
economy than orthodox economists would generally feel comfortable
advocating. This is a built-in tension that the PBC may prove able to
dampen.
Officials in the United Nations’s specialized agencies have long
sought ways of countering the IFIs’s influence over national devel34
opment planning in aid-recipient countries. Indeed, the promotion
of the concept of human development in the 1980s, and its institutionalization in the form of the annual Human Development Report, can
be seen as part of a larger effort on the part of U.N. actors to restore
balance between the two institutional clusters—the IFIs and the U.N.
system. The objective was to establish rough parity in the levels of influence of, on the one hand, the IFIs (which possess greater financial
resources) and, on the other hand, the U.N. system (which generally
35
The impulse toward institupossess greater legitimacy resources).
tional equality continues. From 2006 to 2007, the United Nations
commissioned a study to identify (and assess the merits of) methods
for increasing the United Nations’s “voice” in the creation of national
36
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP).

33

Interview with a high-ranking official of one of the United Nations’s key social
development agencies, in New York City, N.Y. (Dec. 12, 2006).
34
As Ramesh Thakur, a long-time observer of the United Nations, stated, “[T]he
U[nited] N[ations] was instrumental in broadening the concept of development to
make it more human . . . . Since the 1980s this has taken the form of constructive
dissent to the prevailing Washington consensus among the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the US Treasury.” RAMESH THAKUR, THE UNITED NATIONS,
PEACE AND SECURITY 360 (2006).
35
The Human Development Report was established and named precisely to contrast
with the World Bank’s productivity-, growth-, and trade-oriented World Development
Report. For an account of the personalities and ideas that spurred the creation of the
Human Development Report Office, located within the UNDP but possessing its own
mandate from the General Assembly, see TATIANA CARAYANNIS ET AL., UN VOICES: THE
STRUGGLE FOR DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL JUSTICE (2005).
36
The commissioned study, The UN and PRSPs: Process, Content, and Outcomes Amid
Changes in the Architecture of Aid, which covered of eight countries, was conducted for
the United Nations Development Program by an interdisciplinary group of scholars
based at the Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, from 2006 to
2008. Among the more revealing country reports emerging from this study were
James Manor, The United Nations and Zambia’s Fifth Plan: Process, Content and Outcomes
amid Changes in the Architecture of Aid (2007), available at http://www.undg.org/
docs/8969/Zambia-PRS-study.pdf.
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Creating and sticking to a national PRSP is a requirement that
recipient governments must fulfill to be eligible for concessional
lending or long-term debt-relief from the IFIs. A country’s PRSP
spells out a comprehensive, operationalized vision of how the state,
international donors, and civil society will collaborate to achieve national human development objectives, progress on which will be
monitored by a national statistical office. But from the point of view
of many field-based U.N. officials, the priorities and concerns of the
IFIs receive disproportionate weight when national authorities devise
37
the terms of reference for statistical offices. Moreover, approval by
the governing bodies of the IFIs to a large degree determines entrypoint eligibility for funding programs supported by bilateral aid donors (USAID, UK DFID, Sweden’s SIDA, etc.). This leads national
authorities in aid-recipient countries—including, but not limited to,
those in post-conflict states—to be unduly influenced (in the eyes of
critics) by World Bank and IMF staff, who assiduously cultivate relationships with government officials from aid-recipient countries. This
frequently involves temporary Washington consultancies, training
opportunities, and study leaves for those deemed promising. The
IFIs additionally possess a much larger cadre of professional, technically capable economists, covering almost every sub-discipline, which
provides the World Bank and the IMF a serious agenda-setting advan38
tage.
Of course, there is considerable doubt as to just how powerful
the IFIs are in the countries where they operate. This has been a
longstanding concern in the study of the IFIs and the aid community
39
more generally. There are two dimensions to this vein of skepticism, concerning respectively: (a) how much autonomy IFI officials
and Executive Board members genuinely possess vis-à-vis the leading
states that collectively control the management of these institutions;
and (b) how much leverage the World Bank and the IMF can exert in

37

Rob Jenkins & Maxton Tsoka, Institutionalization and Malawi’s PRSP, 21
DEVELOPMENT POL’Y REV. 197, 197–215 (2003).
38
Lyla Mehta, From Darkness to Light? Critical Reflections on the World Development
Report 1998–99, 36 J. DEVELOPMENTAL STUD. 151, 151–61 (1999) (discussing the
World Bank’s various attempts to attain ideological hegemony over the field of development practice).
39
The failure of conditionality-based development was a subject of considerable
academic research in the 1990s. See, e.g., PAUL MOSELY, JANE HARRIGAN & JOHN TOYE,
AID AND POWER: THE WORLD BANK AND POLICY-BASED LENDING (1991); Nicolas van de
Walle & Timothy A. Johnston, Improving Aid to Africa, (Overseas Development Council, Policy Essay No. 21, 1996); Craig Burnside & David Dollar, Aid, Policies, and
Growth, (World Bank Development Research Group, Working Paper No. 1777, 1997).
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their negotiations with individual debtor states to change behaviors
and/or outcomes.
Even so, U.N. agencies continue to be disconcerted by World
Bank and IMF dominance of national economic planning. This has
been the case in highly indebted and aid-dependent countries in
40
general (for instance, in Malawi); but animosity toward IFI dominance of the PRSP process has been particularly acute in post-conflict
countries, where the United Nations’s acknowledged preeminence in
security matters causes U.N. officials to demand a lead role in such
41
contexts.
This pent-up rancor immediately spilled over into the operation
of the PBC once it was up and running with an initial caseload of two
post-conflict countries (Burundi and Sierra Leone). Given the depth
of feeling on both sides of the U.N./IFI divide, it is little surprise that
various U.N. actors have sought to transform the PBC into a lever for
enhancing the U.N. system’s influence over policy and institutional
development in post-conflict states.
Indeed, one of the PBC’s potentially most important functions
could be to counter the influence of the World Bank and the IMF
42
over economic policy in post-conflict countries.
The support for
this kind of role not only reflects the views of PBC members from developing countries, many of which consider themselves past or current victims of high-handed actions by World Bank and IMF staff; it
also corresponds with the perception of many donor governments
and U.N. staff members that the approaches taken by the IFIs are often simply too rigid in post-conflict contexts. Partly, the critique reflects a belief that IFI policy prescriptions are excessively marketoriented. A number of U.N. actors (bureaucratic and political) have
thus coalesced around the position that the PBC could be a useful instrument for rectifying a perceived imbalance between the degree of
influence wielded by, respectively, U.N. missions in post-conflict

40

See Linda Waldman, The United Nations and the Malawian Growth and Development
Strategy Paper: Process, Content and Outcomes amid Changes in the Architecture of Aid
(2007), available at http://www.undg.org/docs/8969/Malawi-IDS-study.pdf.
41
See Steve Darvill, Humanitarian, Multilateral and Community Programs Branch
AusAID, Address at the Conference on Post-Conflict Assistance (July 11, 2002) (transcript available at http://www.inwent.org/ef-texte/conflict/darvill.htm). (noting
“the utility of the PRSP process as a peace-building tool”).
42
Interview with a high-ranking official from a developing country mission that
played a central role in negotiating the PBC’s institutional design, in New York City,
N.Y. (Nov. 2, 2007).

JENKINS (FINAL)

2008]

12/3/2008 1:18:23 PM

U.N. Peacebuilding Commission

1345

countries and the IFI staff who negotiate policy-reform agendas with
43
the governments of these countries.
The influence of a U.N. mission, if headed by a strategically
minded Special (or Executive) Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG or ERSG, respectively), is of course at its height during
the immediate post-conflict stage, when U.N. forces are on the
ground in large numbers. As the security situation stabilizes and
comes increasingly under the control of a state’s sovereign authorities, and U.N. forces are drawn down, the clout of U.N. mission personnel begins to diminish. In contrast, the World Bank and the IMF
are enjoined by their charters from engaging in a full array of donor
activities in countries where legitimate national authorities are not yet
fully installed. But as circumstances change and a more predictable
legal framework returns, the role of the World Bank and the IMF expands enormously, as we shall see.
It is in this context that an impressive cross-section of PBC member-states has rallied behind the currently fashionable aid-community
rhetoric of “national ownership”—the idea that policy and institutional reforms cannot, and should not, be imposed on recipient
countries through conditionality-based aid agreements. This preoccupation with reaffirming the principles of the March 2005 Paris Dec44
laration on Aid Effectiveness (which calls for donors to take a back
seat to national authorities in devising development strategies) reflects the large representation of developing countries in the PBC
and their longstanding frustration with the IFIs, whose commitment
to Paris principles is considered suspect among developing country
45
governments as well as international civil society.
43

The need for a coherent U.N. response to continued World Bank / IMF hegemony—and therefore the utility of a coordinating institution such as the PBC—
was stressed in an interview with a senior official in the U.N. Department of Economics and Social Affairs (DESA), in New York City, N.Y. (Jan. 26, 2008).
44
The Paris Declaration was an outcome of the “High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness,” held in Paris from February 28 through March 2, 2005, which included
representatives of donor and recipient countries, multilateral institutions, and civil
society organizations. The Forum was the culmination of a deliberative process undertaken by the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness and Donor Practices, established
in 2003 by the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC). World Bank,
High Level Forum, Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness: Ownership, Harmonisation,
Alignment,
Results
and
Mutual
Accountability
(2005),
available
at
http://www1.worldbank.org/harmonization/Paris/finalparisdeclaration.pdf.
45
See, e.g., ActionAid International, What Progress? A Shadow Review of World Bank
Conditionality (Aug. 2006), available at http://www.actionaid.org.uk/doc_lib/
what_progress.pdf; Goran Hyden, After the Paris Declaration: Taking on the Issue of
Power, 26 DEVELOPMENT POL’Y REV. 259, 259–74 (2008) (explaining the reasons why it
is difficult to determine the content of national ownership).
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The move toward a “balancing” role for the PBC vis-à-vis the IFIs
is reflected in two developments during the PBC’s first eighteen
months in existence. The first involved the means of operationalizing the Integrated Peacebuilding Strategies (IPBSs) devised for Burundi and Sierra Leone by the PBC in consultation with officials from
these governments, with civil society representatives, and with a broad
46
range of external stakeholders.
These IPBSs, or “Framework”
documents, as noted earlier, draw liberally on existing national strategy papers, including each country’s PRSP or PRSP-equivalent. The
process of devising a Framework document does, however, provide
the PBC (and the U.N. system by extension) the chance to influence
national priorities by indicating which actions are of immediate practical importance to the maintenance of peace and political stability.
In terms of process, the PBC has also sought to ensure that the
United Nations’s voice is given sufficient amplification, and its stature
as the primary international organization responsible for maintaining
peace and security formally reaffirmed. An important victory—
symbolically, at least—in the U.N. system’s quest for parity with the
IFIs is the “monitoring and tracking” mechanisms devised by the PBC
for overseeing the implementation of the Peacebuilding Frameworks
47
for Burundi and Sierra Leone. Despite the weakness of their enforcement provisions, the formal reporting relationships outlined in
these monitoring procedures make clear that the review of the national Peacebuilding Frameworks happens in parallel to, and should
48
carry the same weight as, the IFI-led reviews of national PRSPs.
Commitments under the United Nations’s Development Assistance
Framework and the IFI-led PRSP are accorded equal significance and
49
operational relevance (at least in the eyes of the PBC).
The second indication that the intergovernmental PBC is carving out a role for itself as a counterweight to the IFIs’ dominance
over economic policy and governance reform issues is more substantive in nature and has had practical implications in both countries on
46

S.C. Res. 1645, supra note 1, ¶ 21 (specifying the provision regarding consultation with civil society). Elsewhere in the resolution, the term “local groups” is used.
Id.
47
See, e.g., U.N. Peacebuilding Comm’n, Sierra Leone Peacebuilding Cooperation
Framework, ¶¶ 30–35, PBC/2/SLE/1 (Dec. 3, 2007); U.N. Peacebuilding Comm’n,
Monitoring and Tracking Mechanism of the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi, PBC/2/BDI/4 (Nov. 27, 2007) [hereinafter Monitoring the Burundi Framework].
48
An indication of the mild nature of the follow-up action recommend as part of
the monitoring process can be found in U.N. Peacebuilding Comm’n, Recommendations of the Biannual Review of the Implementation of the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi, ¶¶ 5, 11, 31, PBC/2/BDI/9 (June 23, 2008).
49
Monitoring the Burundi Framework, supra note 47, at ¶¶ 27(b), 28(c).
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the PBC’s agenda. Some PBC members claim that on certain rare
but significant occasions during the PBC’s first 18 months in existence the World Bank and the IMF felt compelled to modify (or at
least be seen to be rethinking) their approaches to Burundi and Sierra Leone. These course corrections, it is asserted, resulted from
50
pressure by PBC members deliberating collectively.
The most frequently cited example was the PBC’s response to
Burundi’s budgetary crisis during the summer and autumn of 2007.
As explained below, this case involved the IMF in one of its least
popular roles—as a reform ‘gatekeeper’ that must certify the macroeconomic rectitude of recipient governments before even bilateral
donor funds can legally begin flowing.
In September 2007, the chair of the PBC’s Country-Specific Configuration (CSC) for Burundi (the Permanent Representative from
Norway) visited Burundi to apprise himself of recent developments
and to assess the general condition of the country’s core institutions.
Following the Chair’s return to New York, the PBC held a series of
meetings at which his findings were discussed. The visit to Burundi
had highlighted a number of problems. Some of these challenges
were by then reasonably well known by key members of the international community, not least because they had been discussed in formal and informal settings in Bujumbura over the previous several
51
months. Many of the acute difficulties that were facing the country
were political in nature, such as the breakdown of the agreement under which Burundi’s remaining rebel forces were to be disarmed and
the parliamentary gridlock that was preventing the passage of legisla-

50

Interview with an official in one of the three institutional pillars of the U.N.
peacebuilding architecture, in New York City, N.Y. (July 1, 2008).
51
See U.N. Peacebuilding Comm’n, Report of the mission of the Peacebuilding Commission to Burundi, ¶¶ 9, 15, 18, PBC/1/BDI/2 (May 21, 2007). For a chronology of the
deteriorating situation in Burundi, see the successive reports of the Secretary General to the Security Council on the situation in Burundi mission (known by its
French acronym, BINUB). The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the
United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi, delivered to the Security Council, S/2007/287
(May 17, 2007) (a hopeful report given investment by subregional states, especially
South Africa, in monitoring the peace); The Secretary-General, Second Report of the
Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi, delivered to the Security
Council, S/2007/682 (Nov. 23, 2007) [hereinafter Burundi, Second Report] (providing a bleaker assessment); The Secretary-General, Third Report of the Secretary-General
on the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi, delivered to the Security Council,
S/2008/330 (May 15, 2008) (conveying the Secretary General’s view that Burundi
had relapsed into violence).
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tion to which the government had committed itself in negotiations
52
with donors.
But the issue that received the most direct attention from PBC
member-states was Burundi’s perilous fiscal situation. Burundi’s dire
economy has its roots in a wide variety of complex developmental pathologies. What was causing the immediate pain in mid-2007, however, was fairly straightforward: the government was effectively bankrupt. Burundi had borrowed as much as international markets (and
official institutions) were willing to lend it. The donors that Burundian leaders were hoping might bail them out were unable to act because most bilateral and multilateral agencies operate under financial
rules that prohibit the disbursement of aid until, as mentioned, the
government’s handling of the macroeconomy is certified by the IMF.
The Chair’s mission report noted that the deteriorating social,
political, and economic situation was being seriously exacerbated by
the IMF’s failure to complete the Sixth (and Final) Review of Burundi’s economic situation, as required under the terms of the IMF’s
53
Poverty Reduction Growth Facility financing agreement with Burundi. The delay in completing the Review was widely seen as a negotiating tactic deployed by the IMF, which was seeking action from the
54
Burundian authorities on unimplemented reform measures. The
practical result of this stand-off was that $93 million in bilateral and
other multilateral budget support for 2007 could not reach Burundi’s
treasury.
In the course of the PBC’s subsequent deliberations, Burundi’s
permanent representative to the United Nations expressed his government’s concern regarding the IMF’s inflexible and doctrinaire
55
approach to his country’s financial-cum-political crisis.
To cope
with Burundi’s budgetary crisis, the IMF allegedly pressed the government to reduce the burden on the exchequer by raising the price
52

Int’l Crisis Group, Burundi: Finalising Peace with the FNL, Africa Report No. 13,
Aug. 28, 2007.
53
The IMF’s Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) offers concessional
finance at 0.5% per annum to qualifying countries. The loans are repayable over ten
years, with a sixty-six-month grace period on principal payments. Such loans are very
attractive to governments of poor countries with weak or non-existent tax bases. See
Int’l Monetary Fund [IMF], The Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF),
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/prgf.htm.
54
Interview with an official working in one of the three institutional pillars of the
U.N. peacebuilding architecture, in New York City, N.Y. (Oct. 31, 2007).
55
Provisions referred to in some instances are those found in documents such as
IMF, Burundi: Fifth Review Under the Arrangement Under the Poverty Reduction and Growth
Facility and Request for Waiver of a Performance Criterion—Staff Report (Mar. 21, 2007);
Press Release, IMF, Executive Board Discussion (Mar. 21, 2007).
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at which state-owned distributors sold petroleum.
Such an approach, Burundi’s ambassador told the PBC, ignored the fragile nature of Burundi’s political situation, which had been unsettled not
only by continued difficulties in implementing an agreement between the government and remaining rebel forces, but also by a series of destabilizing political events, including a strike threat by magistrates. An absence of budget support meant that the government
could not meet its core civil service payroll, a recipe for further instability.
Egypt, Jamaica, and other typically vocal Non-Aligned Movement
(NAM) members chimed in sympathetically and quickly requested
more detailed information from the IMF on the nature of its negotia57
tions with the Burundian authorities. Corruption had been a key
element of the IMF’s “governance concerns” during negotiations with
Burundi’s leaders over the timing and terms of reference for the
Sixth Review. Burundi’s representative informed PBC members that
his government had met almost eighty percent of the policy and institutional reform benchmarks set by the IMF, and that disrupting the
flow of funds was not going to make achieving the other twenty percent any easier. He characterized the IMF’s concerns about nepotism
and probity in public office as an unwarranted extrapolation built
upon a single incident of corruption, which the government had (al58
legedly) already addressed.
In a statement that invoked the PBC’s mandate to promote coordination, the Burundian representative suggested, in a euphemistic
formulation that attracted as much attention as it deflected, that
59
“[p]erhaps the IMF was not working hand-in-hand with the [PBC].”
Burundi’s position, combined with support from Egypt, South Africa,
Rwanda, Angola—and to a lesser extent other members of the PBC as
well—cast a stark spotlight on the work of the IMF.
For the first time since the PBC had come into being, the IMF
began deputing high-level officials to engage in dialogue with the
PBSO. After the formal discussion of the Chair’s report these more
senior IMF representatives met with PBC members to discuss the Bu56

The long-term effects of not doing so may well have been felt in any case. IMF,
Food and Fuel Prices—Recent Developments, Macroeconomic Impact, and Policy Responses,
June 30, 2008, available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2008/
063008.pdf.
57
Press Release, U.N. Peacebuilding Comm’n, Peacebuilding Commission
Adopts Recommendations to Shore Up Peace in Burundi, U.N. Doc. PBC/21 (Sept.
19, 2007).
58
Id.
59
Id.
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60

rundi situation. The IMF was given a stern “talking to” from several
PBC member-states—particularly those developing countries, such as
India, that were keen to showcase their anti-IFI credentials given the
growing perception among NAM countries that India had strayed too
far into the strategic orbit of the United States. The PBC, as usual,
proved an irresistible forum for advancing the interests of its mem61
bers, sometimes in unpredictable and circuitous ways.
The PBC followed its initial deliberations by issuing a report on
the Burundi situation that outlined a series of “conclusions” and
62
“recommendations.” The report conceded the need for change in
Burundi, and recommended that the Government of Burundi “investigate fully and immediately recent governance issues and take necessary steps to strengthen government controls over its expenditures to
63
effectively prevent misuse and misappropriation of public funds.”
But the PBC was unusually direct in recommending to the IFIs that
they “take into account, in the context of the ongoing dialogue between the IMF and the Government of Burundi, the fragile situation
64
in the country in early disbursement of financial support.” The report also suggested that the World Bank and the IMF “continue to actively follow-up on the commitments made at the May 2007 Round
Table and consider additional and/or alternative financial support
in the context of the fragile budgetary situation, bearing in mind the
65
dire needs of the population.”
In related aid-coordination meetings during that period, IMF of66
ficials were said to have demonstrated much greater flexibility. On
September 20, 2007, The day after the PBC’s recommendations on
Burundi were issued, the IMF executive board decided to grant an
exceptional waiver to Burundi that extended funding under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF). This allowed the government of Burundi to stabilize its fiscal position, alleviating some of
60

Interview with an official working in one of the three institutional pillars of the
U.N. peacebuilding architecture, in New York City, N.Y. (Oct. 31, 2007).
61
Interview with a representative of a prominent developing-country PBC member-state, in New York City, N.Y. (Jan. 26, 2008).
62
Chairman of the Burundi Configuration of the PBC, Identical Letters Dated 20
September 2007 from the Chairman of the Burundi Configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission, at 2–4, delivered to the President of the Security Council, the President of the General
Assembly, and the President of the Economic and Social Council, U.N. Doc. PCB/2/BDI/2
(Sept. 19, 2007).
63
Id. at 3.
64
Id. at 4.
65
Id.
66
Interview with a U.N. mission staff member of a major European bilateral donor country, in New York City, N.Y. (Feb. 1, 2008).
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the political uncertainty that had in part stalled the government’s legislative agenda.
In mid-January 2008, the IMF formally completed the Sixth (and
67
Final) Review of Burundi’s PRGF program. The IMF’s official explanation for release of the final tranche of funding under the PRGF
cited the government’s pursuit of what it considered sound macro68
economic policies. But the IMF also referred, obliquely, to the policy- and performance-related reasons for the delay in completing the
Review in the first place, not all of which, it was obvious, were dealt
with by the Burundian government. IMF officials stressed the results
its engagement with the Burundian authorities had achieved, but
there is reason to believe that the PBC’s intervention in Burundi’s
dispute with the IMF contributed to Burundi’s ability to evade IMF
69
conditions.
Whether, in the absence of protest from PBC member-states, the
IMF would have allowed the final $11.4 million tranche of PRGF
funds to be released is counterfactual speculation that defies definitive conclusions. The PBC did, however, provide a high-profile forum in which a cross-section of the international community could
collectively reaffirm the imperative of maintaining political stability in
fragile states, and the need for other economic considerations—such
as fiscal rectitude—to take an occasional backseat. This created an
environment in which IMF officials found it more difficult to take a
hard line on the Burundian authorities for failing to live up to their
reform commitments, not least because the PBC’s diverse membership and its status as an advisory body of the Security Council (whose
five permanent members are also represented on the PBC) invests its
deliberations and pronouncements with considerable weight and legitimacy.
It is reasonable to ask whether pressure from developing country
representatives at the UN would have any impact on IFI officials. On
their own, developing countries are indeed a weak lobby. But when
allied, on an issue-specific basis, with certain progressive northern
donors, or even with one or more permanent members of the Security Council, the voices favoring a less intrusive role for the IFIs become more persuasive. Skeptics might also wonder why well-off do67

IMF, Burundi: Sixth Review Under the Arrangement Under the Poverty Reduction and
Growth Facility and Request for Waiver of Performance Criteria, Country Report No. 08/27
(Jan. 23, 2008).
68
Id.
69
Interview with a U.N. consultant who specializes in police reform in postconflict countries, in New York City, N.Y. (Sept. 7, 2007).
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nor governments would find it either advantageous or necessary to
use the indirect route of PBC engagement in order to influence, say,
the IMF. Such governments are, in general, well represented on the
boards of the IFIs. The most plausible answer is that IFI policy tends
to be dominated by a member-state’s finance ministry or economic
advisers in the office of the president or prime minister, not by the
foreign ministry. So the PBC route, however indirect, offers foreign
ministries—from whom U.N. delegations generally take their orders—an indirect voice in the country-specific deliberations of the
World Bank and the IMF. When economic questions are translated
as threats to the peace, as issues of basic regime stability, security offi70
cials more frequently prevail over their rivals from treasury.
The PBC may not have tamed the IFIs or even reined in rogue
U.N. agencies, which are often big and independent enough to ignore pleas for bureaucratic coordination. But the PBC’s ongoing engagement with Burundi and Sierra Leone has provided a platform
from which alternative views on the role of the IFIs in post-conflict
countries can get a hearing. The view that conflict-reducing measures must increasingly trump economic policy preoccupations has
been a consistent theme among a vocal minority of scholars and prac71
titioners. One analyst, who has served as a senior official in both the
United Nations and the IMF, has argued that economic orthodoxies
must yield to security considerations. The former official acknowledged the difficulty she had faced in trying to convince IFI decisionmakers of the exceptional nature of post-conflict environments.
World Bank and IMF officials—confronted with a distinct set of organizational incentives—tend to favor a limited menu of policy op72
tions.
To conclude this analysis of the PBC’s intergovernmental machinery (including its Country-Specific Configurations, where much
of the substantive action takes place), it is worth noting that the PBC
has been able to perform other counterweight functions as well. Just
as the PBC was able to counteract the influence of the IFIs in limited

70

Interview with a senior Indian diplomat, in Phila., Pa. (Apr. 18, 2008).
This view is growing, however, and increasingly receives explicit support from
member states. See, e.g., Thematic Meeting on Diplomacy, Development, and Integrated Planning in Fragile States, Oslo, Norway, Feb. 11–12, 2008, Final Outcome
Summary. This group of experts and practitioners, in its second recommendation,
said, “Given the fragile context, political considerations and a conflict analysis are essential for international inventions” in the development field. Id. at 1.
72
GRACIANA DEL CASTILLO, REBUILDING WAR-TORN STATES: THE CHALLENGE OF
POST-CONFLICT ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION (2008).
71
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but important ways, the PBC may also emerge as an alternative source
of information for Security Council deliberations.
It has long been the custom that when the Security Council deliberates on mandate renewal or any other pending decision related
to a post-conflict mission, it relies considerably on information provided by the highest resident U.N. official—the Special (or sometimes Executive) Representative of the Secretary General. This information is provided in the form of direct oral briefings as well as
through the Secretary-General’s Reports on individual country situations, which SRSGs play a very large role in producing. SRSGs are accused of shaping reports to reflect their personal biases or career
73
ambitions.
Aware of the potential for ulterior motives, Security
Council members frequently eye SRSGs with suspicion. SRSGs are often seen as excessively cautious, fearing tensions with the host government, whose officials the SRSG must work with on a daily basis regardless of the Security Council’s decision. Other SRSGs have a
reputation for prioritizing changes that can be accomplished within
the time remaining in his or her tenure, whether or not such changes
are priorities for peace. Officials in the Secretariat responsible for
compiling these country-specific reports attempt to make the findings
more politically saleable, a process that is visible enough to spur fur74
ther doubts among Security Council members.
Given that questions surrounding the value of the existing
mechanisms of country-specific reporting, the Security Council would
arguably benefit from an additional channel of information and
analysis. The PBC has managed to position itself as, potentially, a
credible, if far from ideal, alternative. This, its members and champions maintain, is because the PBC’s members travel regularly to the
countries concerned, and because the PBC invites civil society groups
to participate in its meetings (though NGOs are carefully screened by
75
the governments whose cases are under the PBC’s consideration).
73

The Special Representative of the Secretary General for Sierra Leone’s integrated office mission (UNIOSIL) during 2006–2007, was widely regarded as secretive
and unwilling to consult widely with U.N. agencies with a field presence in Freetown.
Interview with an official working in one of the three institutional pillars of the U.N.
peacebuilding architecture, in New York City, N.Y. (May 16, 2007).
74
On the changing role of SRSGs see Manuel Frohlich, The Peace Makers? The
Development of the Role of the Special Representatives of the U.N. Secretary General as a roll of Conflict Resolution (June 7–8, 2007) (presented at the Annual Conference of the Academic Council on U.N. Studies, New York City).
75
U.N. Peacebuilding Comm’n, Organizational Comm., Provisional Report on the
Work of the PBC, U.N. Doc. PBC/2/OC/L.1 (June 28, 2007); Peacebuilding Comm’n,
Organizational Comm., Draft Report of the PBC on its 2nd Session, U.N. Doc.
PBC/2/OC/L.2 (June 23, 2008).
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PBC member-states have tried to make the case, in whichever forums
they belong to, that the PBC is uniquely suited to provide an original,
and less bureaucratically entrenched, perspective to the Security
Council’s deliberations.
Thanks to sustained lobbying by a number of states during the
PBC’s early months, ad hoc invitations were extended by the Security
76
Council to Chairs of the PBC’s two Country-Specific Configurations.
This precedent became firmly established in December 2007, when
the chair of the PBC’s Burundi CSC briefed the Security Council. He
did so against the backdrop of continued instability in Burundi, at a
time when the Security Council was considering the most recent Secretary General’s report on the U.N. Integrated Office in Burundi
77
(BINUB). That the CSC Chairs are themselves member-states affords them a more or less respectful hearing from most Security
Council members, who might otherwise be dismissive of yet more
speechmaking by Secretariat apparatchiks. That CSC Chairs have
tended to come from influential countries—the first two were significant donor states, and the third was an emerging power, Brazil—has
also helped to ease their passage into the Security Council’s institu78
tional milieu.
IV. THE PBSO: “KNOWLEDGE” AND INFLUENCE
Among other things, this essay argues that in order to carve out
a durable niche for itself, the PBC has effectively disaggregated itself
into its component parts, each of which has been waging its own battle for institutional survival. The analytical focus thus far has been on
just one of the three components that make up the PBC: its intergovernmental Commission itself, which includes the thirty-one-member
Organizational Committee and the Country-Specific Configurations
adopted to address specific post-conflict cases on its agenda. For reasons of space, only one of the other two PBC components—the
PBSO, representing its bureaucratic dimension—is analyzed in depth
here. Certain similarities in the workings of the third PBC component—the PBF, the PBC’s financial dimension—are briefly identified
in the conclusion.
76

Interview with a U.N. mission staff member from a country that chaired one of
the PBC’s first two Country Specific Configurations, in New York City, N.Y. (May 27,
2007).
77
Burundi, Second Report, supra note 51.
78
The first three countries on the agenda were assigned the following CSC
Chairs: the Netherlands chaired the Sierra Leone CSC, Norway chaired Burundi’s
CSC, and Brazil chaired Guinea Bissau’s CSC.
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The portion of Security Council Resolution 1645 that refers to
79
the PBSO specifies its limited role. The “Office” (not a full-fledged
“Department”) was to be small and non-operational. PBSO staff were
“to assist and support the [PBC]” by, for instance, “gathering and
80
analyzing information” of various types. This was to include information concerning “the availability of financial resources, relevant
U.N. planning activities, progress towards meeting short and medium-term recovery goals, and best practices with respect to cross81
cutting, peacebuilding issues.”
The process leading up to the establishment of the PBSO, as opposed to its legal authorization in Resolution 1645, was marked by
steadfast opposition from developing countries to making the PBSO
much more than a back-office for the PBC’s deliberations. Negotiations ensued in the General Assembly’s administrative and budget
82
committees over extremely small sums and minor personnel issues.
A concern expressed in developing country delegations (both before
and after passage of Resolution 1645) was that the PBC, and by extension the PBSO, could be a Trojan Horse that would allow the P5
and other leading states to further infiltrate the United Nations’s
economic and social agencies by emphasizing that development failures and imbalances are key contributors to political instability and
conflict, issues squarely in the Security Council’s remit.
At least two factors have helped to make the PBSO potentially a
more formidable institutional actor than its modest statement of
purpose might otherwise suggest. First, as an independent “Office”—
that is, located within neither the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) nor the Department of Political Affairs (DPA)—the
PBSO stands in direct, unmediated relation to the Executive Office of
the Secretary General. This would be less important if the only implication was that the PBSO’s decisions could not be formally vetoed
by intervening department bosses. In practice, however, it means
that the PBSO is provided a valuable point of entry into interagency

79

S.C. Res. 1645, ¶ 23, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1645 (Dec. 20, 2005).
Id.
81
Id.
82
The level of discord could be seen in the concluding paragraphs of the December 2005 Report by the General Assembly’s Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ), on the proposed 2006–2007 budget, where
the committee chastised the Secretary General for going beyond the remit of the
2005 summit outcome in his preparations for the establishment of the PBSO. See
U.N Administrative & Bugetary Comm., The Peacebuilding Commission: Programme
Budget Implications of Draft Resolution A/60/L.40, U.N. Doc. A/60/7/Add.25 (Dec. 16,
2005).
80
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structures of various types. Exploiting such opportunities is part of
the process by which the PBSO has begun occupying a set of unique
organizational niches.
Second, the PBSO is able to draw on the political clout of PBC
member-states with whom it must work closely in its role as the secretariat unit “supporting” the PBC’s intergovernmental machinery.
The PBSO is able to do this while at the same time being able to distance itself from PBC member-states when autonomy is helpful to the
PBSO’s pursuit of its own adaptive strategy for institutional survival.
Two examples of the PBSO’s multipronged effort to occupy an
organizational niche are discussed here. Both illustrative cases are
consciously rooted in what the PBSO calls its “second mandate”—its
system-wide knowledge consolidation and dissemination role, as opposed to its function as a secretariat for the PBC’s intergovernmental
deliberations. The broad nature of this role was reaffirmed in a May
83
2007 statement issued by the Secretary General’s Policy Committee.
This document is cited frequently by PBSO staff when seeking to justify their presence in one or another interagency process.
Attempting to amass organizational influence by serving as a focal point for the collection and refinement of expert knowledge—
especially when this is based on analysis of internal organizational
practices—is a bureaucratic strategy with a long and distinguished
pedigree. There is nothing particularly surprising about the PBSO
pursuing this route. In fact, recent scholarship on international organizations, particularly Barnett and Finnemore’s empirically wideranging work, suggests that it is precisely by framing concepts, relationships, and processes in ways that require expert input to operationalize them that international bureaucracies seek to make themselves indispensable, expand their mandates, and (perhaps most
significantly) wrest a degree of autonomy from member-states and
84
the vagaries of intergovernmental bargaining.
The first example of how the PBSO followed this strategy concerns its involvement in the United Nations’s Integrated Mission
Planning Process (IMPP). U.N. departments and agencies involved
in peace operations have long pressed for a more structured and inclusive process for determining whether, for any prospective country
83

The document, a memorandum from the Secretary General to Members of the
Policy Committee (dated May 22, 2007) contained “Decision No. 2007/28 RE:
Peacebuilding Support Office.” The decision chiefly concerned the “Conceptual Basis for Peacebuilding,” which was effectively broadened, and a statement on the (expanded) “Role of the Peacebuilding Support Office” (PBSO).
84
See, e.g., BARNETT & FINNEMORE, supra note 6.
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case, a multidisciplinary peace operation is feasible and what such an
operation might look like given the exigencies of the present and the
full life-cycle of an integrated U.N. mission—all the way to the point
85
of “exit.” This has resulted in the IMPP “guidelines,” which remain
a work in progress. This foundational policy document outlines how
the IMPP should work in practice. It outlines phases, lead organizations, decision points, and so forth. Its production entailed intense,
line-by-line negotiations over an extended period of time and involved a huge range of bureaucratic and political stakeholders. Some
of the roles and responsibilities, not to mention mandates and timeframes, remained a point of contention up to the time of this writing
in mid 2008.
Even before the PBSO was fully functional, officials associated
with its creation lobbied for the PBSO’s substantial inclusion in the
IMPP guidelines in as many roles as possible. These lobbying efforts—only partly successful—benefited from the assistance of PBC
states that supported the idea that the eventual transition to postconflict peacebuilding must be considered even in the early stages of
devising a strategy for peacekeeping.
The degree of contention over the PBSO’s potential role is apparent from the various versions of this capstone document, formally
entitled, Integrated Missions Planning Process (IMPP): Guidelines Endorsed
86
by the Secretary-General. The tentative nature of PBSO involvement is
evident from the version dated June 13, 2006, which was issued just as
the PBC and the PBSO were coming formally into being. As noted,
lobbying on behalf of the PBSO had begun considerably earlier, with
several donor states seeking to increase the new unit’s organizational
heft—a strategy that, as we have seen, generated opposition (and
much enlivened proceedings) in the General Assembly’s committee
rooms. Several roles for the PBSO and the PBC are envisaged. But
interpreting the guidelines is ultimately as much a matter of political
negotiation as their formulation had been in the first place. To date,

85

See Panel on U.N. Peace Operations, Report of the Panel on U.N. Peace Operations,
U.N. Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809 (Aug. 21, 2000).
86
A footnote in the June 13, 2006, version clarifies that the guidelines apply only
to peace support operations occurring in a “post-conflict setting” where the U.N.
“mounts multi-disciplinary peace support operations of which a peacekeeping mission is a component.” U.N., INTEGRATED MISSIONS PLANNING PROCESS (IMPP):
GUIDELINES ENDORSED BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON 13 JUNE 2006 (2006), available at
www.undg.org/docs/8481/IMPP.pdf [hereinafter JUNE GUIDELINES]. The guidelines
state explicitly that “[d]ifferent processes may apply for United Nations peace support operations where no peacekeeping operation is involved.” Id. at 2.
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the PBSO has proven reasonably adept at making the most of its
marginal presence within the IMPP guidelines.
The PBSO is mentioned in the preamble to the guidelines,
which are structured like a decision-making flowchart, with various
U.N. entities drawn into (and lifted out of) the activity matrix as their
participation ebbs and flows. There is mention of a (relatively unspecified) role for the PBC in the “pre-decision” stage of the missionplanning process. “Prior to a decision by the Secretary General to
initiate detailed planning,” the PBSO would (in order to provide the
Security Council and other relevant actors with a full, longitudinal
picture of the commitment envisaged) be “responsible for devising
longer-term strategies to help countries fully recover from conflict,
help bring the U.N. system together, and also draw together nonU.N. actors, including IFIs and regional organizations in support of a
87
common strategy.” This language echoes the wording of the resolution creating the PBC, but applies the tasks to the PBSO independently of
the intergovernmental PBC. According to the IMPP Guidelines, if a decision is taken to begin more detailed planning for a potential (still yet
unapproved) peace-support operation, three stages would ensue: (1)
advanced planning; (2) operational planning; and (3) review and
transition planning. Each stage has multiple levels and triggers for
decision-making and action.
Two of the four triggers for initiating the IMPP involve the PBC
and/or the PBSO: (i) “a recommendation by the [PBC], or a request
by a Member State or regional organization, to the U.N. SecretaryGeneral to consider possible options, including a peace support operation”; and (ii) “[t]he development by the PBC or PBSO of an
88
overarching strategy for U.N. peacebuilding support.” Though the
PBSO is not mentioned in the first of these, it would play a critical yet
indirect role by shaping the analysis of the PBC’s “recommenda89
tion.” In practice, the PBSO will not trigger anything on its own. It
is nevertheless significant for a small U.N. entity to be part of the
process for deciding which country situations are ripe for a missionlevel intervention.
Once it is decided to “initiate the IMPP,” the “advanced planning” phase begins, carried out by an Integrated Mission Task Force
(IMTF), which is led by the Department of Political Affairs, but with
inputs from the PBSO. The key activity during this initial stage of the
IMPP is the “Strategic Assessment,” which outlines what functions the
87
88
89

Id.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 5.
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United Nations might credibly perform, what assumptions have been
made about the nature of the conflict in question, and the potential
scenarios that might affect the conduct of such a mission. In doing
so, the IMTF is expected to “draw on the strategic analysis of the
90
PBSO,” among others.
If it is determined that the Strategic Assessment provides a basis
for moving forward, the Secretary General issues a Strategic Planning
Directive, which outlines the objectives of the mission. In the “operational planning stage,” the DPKO takes the lead. The guidelines indicate, however, that the draft Strategic Planning Directive would be
prepared “in consultation with the PBSO,” providing another opportunity for the PBSO to shape, even if only at the margins, the parame91
ters of a proposed peace operation. The PBSO also has a role in the
“review and transition planning” phase. “[T]he PBSO should be
regularly updated” on the conduct of the mission, the purpose being
to allow input from the PBSO on the likely implications of decisions
that will profoundly affect the post-conflict environment and, there92
fore, the range of options facing peacebuilding agencies.
The section of the guidelines on “Initiating Transition and Exit
Planning” indicates that the “Mission Plan should contain triggers
and benchmarks for initiating transition and exit planning,” and that
these will have been “developed in close collaboration with,” among
93
other entities, the PBSO. The issue of “transition” (an operation’s
multi-stage exit from a post-conflict situation) is also reflected in the
second example of the PBSO’s ability to adapt itself to a difficult environment. Indeed, the PBSO has sought to make use of its knowledge consolidation and dissemination role in order to influence what
it sees as a key Security Council priority—understanding the conditions that can facilitate exit.
To influence the Security Council’s decisions regarding the
gradual drawing-down of peace operations, the closing of postconflict missions, or indeed Security Council doctrine on transitions
more generally, the PBSO saw the need to combine its knowledgeconsolidation mandate with its participation in relevant interagency
initiatives. Among the forums in which the PBSO has been engaged
is the U.N. Interdepartmental Framework for Coordination on Early
Warning and Preventive Action. The “Framework Team,” as it is
known, is coordinated by the UNDP’s Bureau of Crisis Prevention
90
91
92
93

Id. at 6.
Id. at 7.
JUNE GUIDELINES, supra note 87, at 8–12.
Id. at 15.
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and Recovery. Its mission is to refine methods for anticipating the
outbreak of violence, assessing the likely severity of nascent conflicts,
and recommending the most appropriate programmatic interven94
tions.
The Framework Team maintains an informal “watch list”—
though it does not use this term—of countries to be monitored,
which includes those residing in conflict-ridden regions. It devotes
attention to all countries where regime stability is threatened by systemic violence—not just states “emerging from conflict,” which is the
95
PBC’s designated area of responsibility.
The Framework Team—
which seeks to expand the remit and enhance the stature of the
Peace and Development Advisors it has helped to deploy in various
conflict zones—provides a point of access for the PBSO into a policy
arena (conflict-prevention in states that have not recently experi96
enced war) where it is otherwise short on influence.
Perhaps as importantly, the Framework Team provides a forum
in which the PBSO can attempt to steer the debate on the conditions
under which “transitions” (toward full de facto state sovereignty) are
best undertaken. The PBSO has done this by seeking space on the
agenda of the Expert Reference Group (ERG), which supports the
Framework Team in planning U.N. system-wide program interventions by refining the analytical tools at its disposal. The ERG, for instance, assesses the relevance of competing models of conflict dynam97
ics and the applicability of various risk indicators.
The PBSO has cultivated relations with other agencies and offices represented on the ERG and the Framework Team, and it has,
in accordance with its mandate, attempted to influence the choice of
analytical instruments used in assessing post-conflict situations. In
late-2007, the PBSO commissioned a study of potential transition in94

The mission and structure of the Framework Team, as well as the Bureau of
Crisis Prevention and Recovery, which is part of the U.N. Development Program, is
available at http://www.undp.org/cpr/.
95
Id.
96
The Expert Reference Group associated with the Framework Team outlined its
conclusions concerning the future role of the Peace and Development Advisors—
and hailed the “historic” work of the Framework Team itself. Experience-Sharing
and Capacity Development Workshop for U.N. Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Practitioners to Enhance Conflict Prevention Programming, Oct. 30–Nov. 2,
2007, The Naivasha Process Report.
97
The emphasis on analytical tools and the identification and dissemination of
best practice is evident from a funding application devised by the Framework Team
in 2006. Memorandum from the U.N. Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Recovery,
Funding Proposal: Enhancing the Framework Team (May 2006) (on file with author).
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dicators and relevant datasets whose findings were disseminated
98
through the ERG. This represented an effort to build support for
the creation of a model of conflict-to-peace analysis that could guide
U.N. agencies in planning for the transition from a country situation
defined by its post-conflict status to one focused on a longer-term developmental agenda. The PBSO’s proposals received a mixed response—at least in the early stages of the process covered in the research for this essay—but the fact of having asserted a legitimate
interest in this issue has positioned the PBSO to continue participating in negotiations on these and related matters.
V. CONCLUSION
This essay has argued that, despite the PBC’s weak mandate, its
highly contingent “advisory” status, and its politically contentious origins, this still-fledgling body has emerged from its first two years in
existence as a significant force in an unpromising institutional environment. The PBC and the PBSO are now visible actors in the community of international actors engaged in the rebuilding of postconflict states. As envisaged by their architects, both institutions participate in broader institutional discussions on the causes of violent
conflict and the best means of preventing its eruption or recur99
rence. Given the speed with which newly minted international bodies can begin slipping into terminal irrelevance almost from the mo100
ment of inception, this is a considerable accomplishment.
The ability of the PBC to carve out a role for itself—even if its
precise value-added is difficult to pin down—has rested on the relative freedom granted by Resolution 1645, which effectively allowed
each of the PBC’s component parts (the three pillars of the U.N.’s
‘peacebuilding architecture’) to pursue its own means of ensuring institutional survival. It is worth noting that certain aspects of the
PBC’s adaptive response challenge the conventional wisdom on why
international organizations (IOs) evolve as they do. The PBSO is a
good example of a bureaucratic entity created by states not as a way of
investing an existing IO with greater decision-making autonomy, the
phenomenon with which most international relations scholarship is
98

Memorandum from the U.N. Peacebuilding Comm’n, Measuring Peace Consolidation and Supporting Transition, (Dec. 2007).
99
The need for such a capacity is evident from theoretically informed empirical
research. See, e.g., PAUL COLLIER ET AL., BREAKING THE CONFLICT TRAP: CIVIL WAR AND
DEVELOPMENT POLICY (2003).
100
A classic example is the long-dormant Military Staff Committee created under
Article 47 of the United Nations Charter. NAT’L WAR COLLEGE, THE UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY COUNCIL MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE: RELIC OR REVIVAL? (1994).

JENKINS (FINAL)

1362

12/3/2008 1:18:23 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:1327

concerned. Indeed, discussions leading up to the creation of the
PBC and the PBSO—and the subsequent negotiations over operational rules once the PBC had come formally into being—were
marked by a strong insistence by many states that ambitions for the
PBC be scaled back. Initial plans for the PBSO to possess an “early
warning” capacity—along the lines of what it is now engaged in
through its work in the Framework Team—were successfully resisted
by a coalition consisting mainly of developing-country member-states.
Yet, the PBC and its various components have managed to find ways
101
of “remaining relevant.”
This essay has focused on two of the three pillars of the peacebuilding architecture—the PBC and the PBSO. But it should be
noted that the third pillar, the PBF, has also managed to play an outsized role in the field of post-conflict financing—again, by stressing its
autonomy from the PBSO and the PBC. The PBF was dismissed
originally by many observers as: (a) yet another multi-donor trust
fund; (b) inadequate for the size of the peace and post-conflict operations the United Nations would need to mount; and/or (c) too
tethered to an intergovernmental process (the PBC), which would stifle innovative ideas.
Thanks to efforts by actors operating within the PBF’s
multistakeholder governance structure, the PBF has become a far
more important sub-institution than was initially predicted. The Secretary Generals’s cabinet now regards the PBF as a strategic resource—a pool of untied funds that can be used to initiate timely action even in pre-conflict situations. This is a complicated story that
cannot be fully explicated here. But the crucial point is that it was
the creative interpretation of the PBF’s underspecified mandate and
the vagueness concerning aspects of its institutional location, which
allowed it to achieve the institutional relevance it now enjoys. In effect, while the PBF responds to the requests of the PBC’s memberstates for catalytic funding in priority areas identified by its Country
Specific Configurations, the PBF operates “windows” for other countries in crisis or at critical breaking points. At this writing, these have
included Chad, Cote D’Ivoire, the Central African Republic, and Liberia. For donor countries that are not PBC members—and even for
some that are—the PBF represents an attractive channel of influence.
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Interview with a U.N. mission official from one of the leading aid-donor member-states on the PBC, in New York City, N.Y., May 18, 2007.
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Non-governmental advocacy organizations are similarly seeking to in102
fluence the procedures and priorities of the PBF’s grantmaking.
Finally, let us briefly consider two factors that might shape the
PBC’s institutional trajectory and the roles to be played by its various
components. The first concerns the PBC’s future caseload. If the
PBC continues to be assigned cases, like Sierra Leone and Burundi,
where conflicts are long past their “hot” phases, then the types of engagement that the PBC can play will remain limited. It will engage
with governments for which aid priorities have, for the most part, already been agreed. On the other hand, if countries are placed on
the PBC’s agenda at a much earlier phase in the peacemaking process—as is the case with Guinea Bissau and the Central African Republic—then the various pillars of the peacebuilding architecture are
likely to encounter expanded opportunities for influence.
The second factor that may make a difference in determining
how the PBC’s component parts go about adapting to an institutional
environment in which they remain, in many respects, minor players is
the trajectory of other elements of U.N. reform. To date, the PBC
has benefited from certain aspects of the ongoing reform agenda. It
is often claimed, for instance, that the leading states represented in
the PBC faced enormous pressure to avoid “failure” during its initial
eighteen months in existence. This is because the other main institutional reform produced by the 2005 World Summit—the Human
Rights Council—was being written off as little better than the discredited Human Rights Commission it replaced. At several low points in
the PBC’s short history, its member-states, as well as the PBSO, have
worked assiduously to dispel the impression that the PBC might be
similarly dysfunctional. This resulted in strenuous efforts to avoid delays in meeting organizational milestones and to defuse conflict
within the ranks of the PBC’s member-states. Had this kind of external motivation not materialized, it is doubtful whether the PBC would
have accomplished as much as it has.
The PBC’s components may be forced to adapt to the implications of potential changes, such as the consolidation of U.N. entities
(following recommendation of the High-Level Panel on U.N. System103
Wide Coherence) or aspects of management reform. In the mean102

Int’l Crisis Group, Sierra Leone, A New Era of Reform?, Africa Report No. 143,
July 31, 2008.
103
High-Level Panel on U.N. System-Wide Coherence in the Areas of Development, Humanitarian Assistance, and the Environment, Follow-Up to the Outcome of the
Millennium Summit, U.N. Doc. A/61/583 (Nov. 20, 2006).
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time, the mere possibility of these or other frequently discussed reforms taking place is sufficient to fuel a great deal of anticipatory posturing on the part of U.N. agencies of all types. To the extent that
these actors see the PBC as a terrain upon which the struggle for influence can be played out, it has valid hopes for continued relevance.

